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Connecticut’s Post-and-Hold Out: Total Wine’s 
Challenge to The Liquor Control Act & Antitrust 
Implications
EMILY GAIT
At first blush, Connecticut’s liquor laws serve the noble purpose of protecting 
the state’s small businesses. The policy argument for the regulations could go 
something like—maybe we don’t want lower alcohol prices in the state, maybe we 
want to advocate for temperance and protect local shops from big box chains. What 
the argument does not consider is the reality of who bears the cost and who profits 
from the laws as written. Prices in the alcoholic-beverage industry are controlled 
by wholesalers, without oversight by the state. Consumers pay higher prices and 
wholesalers mop up the profits. Under the laws, there is virtually no incentive for 
competition. Prices are stable, consistent, uniform, and high. 
Antitrust principles could not be more at odds with Connecticut’s regulatory 
scheme. But what about Connecticut’s authority to regulate the alcoholic-beverage 
industry without interference from the federal government? The doctrine of state-
action immunity recognizes state’s authority and limits federal government 
interference when the state is actively involved in the oversight of private market 
participants and prices. State laws only violate antitrust principles when private
participants assume control over prices . Connecticut’s liquor laws do just that. The 
laws actually mandate price sharing. They leave price control of the 
alcoholic-beverage industry in the hands of the wholesalers, and consumers pay the 
price.
This Note argues that Connecticut’s liquor laws are per se illegal because they 
always, or almost always, restrict competition. But that argument need not be 
interpreted as the last drop in the bucket for the local package store. There are other 
ways to protect small merchants. Connecticut has enacted, and can continue to 
enact laws that support local businesses and limit big box takeover. Connecticut 
should follow other states around the nation which have done away with similar 
laws and opened up the alcoholic-beverage market to healthy competition.
NOTE CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION........................................................................................563 
I. TOTAL WINE’S COMPLAINT...........................................................564 
II. THE SHERMAN ACT..........................................................................565 
A. PER SE VIOLATION..........................................................................565 
B. HORIZONTAL OR VERTICAL PRICE FIXING ......................................566 
C. LEADING CASES..............................................................................568 
III. THE LIQUOR ACT ..............................................................................570 
A. THE POST-AND-HOLD REQUIREMENT..............................................571 
B. THE MINIMUM PRICING STANDARD................................................572 
C. THE VOLUME DISCOUNT PROHIBITION ...........................................573 
D. APPLICATION TO CONNECTICUT’S LIQUOR LAWS...........................573 
IV. STATE ACTION IMMUNITY.............................................................574 
V. STATE INTEREST JUSTIFICATION.................................................578 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................579 
Connecticut’s Post-and-Hold Out: Total Wine’s 
Challenge to The Liquor Control Act & Antitrust 
Implications
EMILY ADAMS GAIT *
INTRODUCTION
Antitrust laws are intended to promote competition and enable 
consumers to benefit from the forces of a competitive market—spurring 
innovation, efficiency, and applying constant downward pressure on prices. 
There are times, however, when antitrust principles come into conflict with 
other interests. Liquor laws are a prime example. States are concerned with 
the sale, regulation, distribution, and consumption of alcohol. The Twenty-
First Amendment to the United States Constitution recognizes states’ ability 
to regulate alcohol within their borders; across the nation, states maintain
regulatory schemes governing alcohol producers’ and retailers’ sales of 
alcohol to consumers. When challenged, courts examine these regulatory 
schemes to determine whether the alcoholic-beverage industry is 
appropriately shielded from the competitive market forces that antitrust laws 
seek to promote. 
What happens when a state’s alcoholic-beverage regulatory scheme 
leads to anticompetitive outcomes thereby conflicting with antitrust laws?
This Note considers this conflict within the context of a lawsuit brought by 
the national liquor retailer, Total Wine. Total Wine is challenging 
Connecticut’s Liquor Control Act of 1933 (the “Liquor Act”), claiming that 
it violates antitrust laws, unreasonably restrains competition, and harms 
consumers. The essential questions are: Does the Liquor Act merely entail 
vertical resale price maintenance that is immune to antitrust laws? Or does 
it fall into a different category more closely resembling an industry-wide 
regulatory scheme still considered a per se violation of antitrust laws? This 
Note explores recent case law and the arguments on both sides of the Total 
Wine case. Ultimately, this Note concludes that the Liquor Act places 
irresistible pressure on liquor market participants to violate antitrust laws 
because it authorizes and mandates collusive conduct while simultaneously 
prohibiting price competition. 
                                                                                                                         
* University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2019. Many thanks to Professor Hillary 
Greene for an education in antitrust, the push to find my voice, and for serving as a brilliant mentor long 
after this Note. Eduardo, mom, and dad – thank you simply isn’t sufficient to show my gratitude for 
giving me the chance to enjoy law school. A special thanks to Steven Carlyle Cronig for the intense 
summer session editing course. Also, thank you to the Connecticut Law Review members for the tedious 
and often thankless work that goes into editing.
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I. TOTAL WINE’S COMPLAINT
In August 2016, Total Wine filed a complaint challenging Connecticut’s 
post-and-hold requirement, minimum pricing standard, and volume discount 
prohibition as violations of federal and state antitrust laws.1 Total Wine’s 
complaint is simple: antitrust law interests override Connecticut’s interests. 
Total Wine alleges that the Liquor Act prevented it from offering the 
“best prices” by creating an anticompetitive state regulatory regime that 
intentionally promotes horizontal and vertical price-fixing by Connecticut 
wholesalers of alcoholic beverages.2 The complaint argues that the 
challenged provisions of the Liquor Act “facilitate and impel vertical and 
horizontal price-fixing among manufacturers and wholesalers.”3 Total Wine 
states that manufacturers and wholesalers “fix and maintain prices at levels 
substantially above what fair and ordinary market forces would dictate” by 
setting bottle and case prices, sharing price information, and coordinating to 
match competitors’ pricing, “resulting in horizontal price-fixing at the 
wholesale level.”4
In October 2016, Connecticut filed a motion to dismiss Total Wine’s 
complaint stating that Total Wine failed to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted.5 Connecticut argues that the Liquor Act is a valid state 
regulation seeking to prevent price discrimination among alcoholic-
beverage retailers.6 Connecticut asserts that Total Wine failed to allege 
sufficient facts to support the argument that an actual agreement among 
wholesalers exists, and that facts showing an agreement are required for the 
court to determine that the Liquor Act violates antitrust laws.7 Connecticut 
concedes that the Fourth and Ninth Circuits found similar state alcohol 
regulations in violation of antitrust laws, but argues that under fact-pleading
standards, Total Wine’s complaint should be dismissed for lack of sufficient 
factual detail.8
Shortly after Connecticut filed its motion to dismiss, five intervening 
defendants filed a brief in support of the state.9 The intervenors first claim 
that there is no actual “irreconcilable conflict” between Connecticut’s 
                                                                                                                         
1 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 35-26 et seq.; Complaint at 3–4, Connecticut Fine Wine 
& Spirits v. Harris, 255 F. Supp. 3d 355 (D. Conn. 2017) (No. 3:16-cv-1434).
2 Complaint, supra note 1, at 3.
3 Id. at 4.
4 Id.
5 Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 1, Connecticut Fine Wine & Spirits v. 
Harris, 255 F. Supp. 3d 355 (D. Conn. 2017) (No. 3:16-cv-1434).
6 Id. at 4.  
7 Id. at 12, 16.  
8 Id. at 13.  
9 Intervenors’ Joint Reply in Support of Their Motions to Dismiss at 1, Connecticut Fine Wine & 
Spirits v. Harris, 255 F. Supp. 3d 355 (D. Conn. 2017) (No. 3:16-cv-1434) [hereinafter Intervenors’ 
Brief].   
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regulatory scheme and antitrust laws.10 They argue that Total Wine has not 
established an irreconcilable conflict, and therefore antitrust law interests 
cannot override the state’s interests.11 The motion goes on to argue that the 
challenged provisions are not per se violations, are not horizontal restraints, 
and do not leave pricing power in the hands of market participants.12 Finally, 
they argue that the specific allegations made by Total Wine should not be 
considered, as they are beyond the scope of a facial challenge.13
II. THE SHERMAN ACT
The Sherman Act states that “[e]very contract, combination . . . or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . . . is 
declared to be illegal.”14 The Supreme Court has never “taken a literal 
approach to this language,”15 but rather has said that the Act “outlaw[s] only 
unreasonable restraints.”16 As the Ninth Circuit stated in Costco Wholesale 
Corp. v. Maleng, the federal government only has the authority to strike 
down a state statute as an antitrust violation if the “statute on its face 
irreconcilably conflicts with federal antitrust policy.”17 The “threshold 
question” is, then, whether Connecticut’s liquor laws irreconcilably conflict 
with the Sherman Act.18 California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. 
Midcal Aluminum, Inc. established the two-step balancing test to determine 
whether a state liquor regulation violates the Sherman Act.19 The first step 
analyzes whether the state regulation actually violates the Sherman Act, and 
the second step evaluates whether the state has immunity based on a finding 
that the regulation is clearly articulated and actively supervised by the
state.20
A. Per Se Violation
Antitrust analysis is industry-specific, and courts are hesitant to 
condemn behavior that has not been thoroughly analyzed to determine 
whether there are any procompetitive effects that warrant further economic 
                                                                                                                         
10 Id. at 5–7.  
11 Id.
12 Id. at 6–7 (citing Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 898 (2007)). 
13 Id. at 9. 
14 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
15 Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006). 
16 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).  
17 Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 874, 885–86 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Rice v. Norman 
Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982)).
18 Id. at 885.  
19 See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 111 (1980) 
(invalidating a California statute that required all producers, wholesalers, and rectifiers of wine to file 
contracts or price schedules with the state).
20 Id. at 105. 
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analysis.21 The per se rule treats certain behavior as a violation of antitrust 
laws and eliminates the need to study the reasonableness of each activity 
where the courts understand the market forces within the industry.22 Per se
violations always or almost always restrict competition.23 Restraints that are 
per se unlawful include horizontal agreements among competitors to fix 
prices.24 Restraints that require a case-by-case analysis of pro- and 
anticompetitive effects are evaluated under what is called the rule of 
reason.25 While the distinction facially appears sharp, “it has recently been 
suggested that the Court has effectively abandoned a dichotomous approach 
to analyzing reasonableness. The fundamental inquiry is ‘whether or not the 
challenged restraint enhances competition,’ not which label to attach to the 
conduct under review.”26
B. Horizontal or Vertical Price Fixing
At the most basic level, horizontal relationships are between competitors 
at the same level. For example, two wholesalers in the same geographic area 
would be considered horizontal. Vertical relationships are between parties 
either down- or upstream in the supply chain. For example, a wholesaler and 
a retailer such as Total Wine. “Restraints that are per se unlawful include 
horizontal agreements among competitors to fix prices.”27 There has, 
however, been a recent shift to recognize that vertical agreements to fix 
prices (minimum resale price maintenance) may have procompetitive effects 
and are no longer considered per se illegal.28 In Leegin Creative Leather 
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., the Court explored the question of whether 
vertical resale price maintenance should be considered per se illegal under 
the Sherman Act.29 Until Leegin in 2007, the established rule was that a 
“vertical agreement between a manufacturer and its distributor to set 
minimum resale prices” was per se illegal.30
In that case, the leather belt manufacturer, Leegin, set a suggested retail 
price for the Brighton belt brand and refused to supply to the retailer Kay’s 
Kloset because Kay’s Kloset sold the belts to consumers below the 
                                                                                                                         
21 State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 10.  
22 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) (citing Bus. Elecs. 
Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988)).
23 Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988).
24 Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006).
25 See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS OF PRODUCT 
DISTRIBUTION 25 (2006) (citing 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶
1500–11 (2d ed. 2003)) (discussing per se and rule-of-reason standards).
26 Id. (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779–80 (1999)).
27 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 551 U.S. at 886 (citing Dagher, 547 U.S. at 5).
28 See ABA, supra note 25, at 77 (“Since 1911, it has been per se unlawful for a manufacturer to 
agree with its distributor or dealer on minimum resale pricing.”).
29 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 551 U.S. at 885. 
30 Id. at 887.  
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suggested retail price.31 Leegin argued that it wanted to maintain an image 
of high quality by selling at specialty stores focused on customer service 
rather than discount retailers.32 It established a vertical minimum resale price 
by prohibiting any retailer from selling Brighton belts to consumers below a 
certain price. Leegin asserted that since there was no concerted action, the 
policy did not violate antitrust laws.33
The Court in Leegin formally recognized potential procompetitive 
effects of vertical restraints and the “differences in economic effect between 
vertical and horizontal agreements.”34 In making this shift, the court quoted 
the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law’s Antitrust Law and 
Economics of Product Distribution, stating “the bulk of the economic 
literature on [resale price maintenance] suggests that [it] is more likely to be 
used to enhance efficiency than for anticompetitive purposes.”35 The Court 
also cited The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution, which states 
that vertical minimum resale price maintenance “is competitively benign in 
the great majority of situations when it is not being used to facilitate 
collusion.”36 In The Antitrust Paradox, A Policy at War with Itself, Robert 
H. Bork describes vertical restraints as a positive means of creating 
economic efficiencies, but he excludes from the procompetitive analysis 
“restraints, vertical in form only, that are actually imposed by horizontal 
cartels at any level of the industry, e.g. resale price maintenance that is 
compelled not by the manufacturer but by the pressure of organized 
retailers.”37
The Leegin Court also discussed the potential anticompetitive effects of 
vertical price fixing.38 If retailers collude and fix prices, the manufacturer is 
likely not acting in the interest of efficiency, but enabling inefficient retailers 
to take advantage of the system and make higher profits.39 “Resale price 
maintenance, furthermore, can be abused by a powerful manufacturer or 
retailer,” which could lead to less innovation in distribution-cost reduction.40
The Court said that “[a] horizontal cartel among competing manufacturers 
or competing retailers that decreases output or reduces competition in order 
to increase price is, and ought to be, per se unlawful.”41 The Court 
acknowledged both pro- and anticompetitive effects as possible results of 
                                                                                                                         
31 Id. at 883.  
32 Id.
33 Id. at 884. 
34 Id. at 888.  
35 Id. at 889 (quoting ABA, supra note 25, at 77).
36 Id. (emphasis added) (citing HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE 
AND EXECUTION 186 (2005)).
37 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 288 (1978).
38 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 892.
39 Id. at 893.
40 Id.
41 Id. (citations omitted).
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vertical restraints and held that the vertical restraints did not meet the per se
criteria of always, or almost always, producing anticompetitive results.42
C. Leading Cases
Four cases have addressed state alcohol regulations, similar to the 
Liquor Act.43
1. Second Circuit, 1984: Battipaglia v. New York State Liquor 
Authority
The court in Battipaglia, in an opinion written by Judge Friendly, 
evaluated New York’s liquor laws that mandated a minimum price increase 
and required wholesalers to post prices with the state.44 The court 
distinguished New York’s laws from California’s laws struck down in 
Midcal by stating that New York’s law “merely requires wholesalers to post 
and adhere to their own unilaterally determined prices and nothing more,” 
whereas Midcal struck down a law that mandated a resale price.45 The court 
found that the requirement to exchange information is distinct from acting 
in 
agreement—combining or colluding—and the former is not a per se
violation that is preempted by the Sherman Act.46 The law “does not 
mandate or authorize conduct that necessarily constitutes a violation of the 
antitrust laws in all cases.”47
2. United States Supreme Court, 1987: 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy
New York’s liquor laws again came under scrutiny in 324 Liquor 
Corp.,48 although the Supreme Court did not discuss Battipaglia. At issue 
were New York’s minimum pricing and post-and-hold requirements.49 The 
court relied on the Midcal analysis and Parker v. Brown state-action 
immunity evaluation to determine whether the regulations were clearly 
stated and actively supervised by the state.50 The Court noted that “industry-
                                                                                                                         
42 Id. at 894 (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988)).
43 I selected two circuit cases decided after Leegin in order to address how courts are evaluating 
state liquor regulatory schemes following the Leegin decision, which held minimum resale price 
maintenance to no longer be a per se violation of antitrust law. I selected Battipaglia because the judge
relied on the holding to dismiss the Total Wine case. I selected 324 Liquor Corp. because it is the relevant 
United States Supreme Court precedent.
44 Battipaglia v. New York State Liquor Auth., 745 F.2d 166, 168 (2d Cir. 1984). 
45 Id. at 172. 
46 Id. at 175.  
47 Id. (internal citations omitted).
48 479 U.S. 335 (1987).
49 Id. at 337.
50 Id. at 341–44; see also Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) (establishing the two-part test 
for state-action immunity as requiring a restraint to be (1) clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed 
and (2) actively supervised by the state itself).
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wide resale price maintenance also may facilitate cartelization” and 
“prevents manufacturers and wholesalers from allowing or requiring retail 
price competition.”51 Wholesalers were able to set prices and retailers were 
forbidden from reducing those minimum prices.52 The Supreme Court held
that New York’s liquor laws were inconsistent with the Sherman Act 
because the statute applied “to all wholesalers and retailers of liquor.”53 The 
Court held resale price maintenance a per se violation of antitrust laws since
it is “virtually certain to reduce interbrand competition as well as intrabrand 
competition, because it prevents manufacturers and wholesalers from 
allowing or requiring retail price competition.”54
3. Ninth Circuit, 2008: Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng
Washington’s liquor laws consisted of nine different challenged 
provisions including a post-and-hold requirement, minimum-mark-up 
provision, and volume-discount prohibition.55 The Ninth Circuit noted that 
under the post-and-hold requirement, wholesalers were not required to price 
match, as the law only required that they maintain their own price for the 
month.56 However, the court concluded that the logical result of post-and-
hold is “a less uncertain market, a market more conducive to collusive and 
stabilized pricing, and hence a less competitive market.”57 “[A]greements to 
adhere to posted prices are anticompetitive because they are highly likely to 
facilitate horizontal collusion among market participants.”58 The court had 
“little trouble concluding that the post-and-hold scheme would constitute a 
per se violation of the Sherman Act.”59
The Ninth Circuit’s approach was unique because it did not treat all the 
regulations as a bundle. Instead, the court severed the minimum-mark-up 
and volume-discount provisions from the post-and-hold requirement, 
holding only the post-and-hold requirement a per se violation of antitrust 
laws.60 The court determined that without the invalid post-and-hold at the 
center of the regulatory scheme, the additional provisions did not constitute 
per se violations of the Sherman Act.61 According to the court, “[t]he 
discretion to set a price, in the absence of any obligation to post it or maintain 
it for any period of time, is not a grant of discretion that facilitates horizontal 
                                                                                                                         
51 324 Liquor Corp., 479 U.S. at 342.
52 Id. 
53 Id.  
54 Id.
55 Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 874, 883 (9th Cir. 2008).
56 Id. at 894.  
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 896.  
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 901. 
61 Id. at 897–98, 901. 
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price collusion.”62 It seems, in Washington at least, the setting of prices 
alone was not anticompetitive, but the setting, posting, and maintaining 
violated antitrust law.63
4. Fourth Circuit, 2009: TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer
Maryland’s liquor laws consisted of a post-and-hold requirement and a 
volume-discount prohibition.64 The Fourth Circuit viewed Maryland’s 
liquor laws as horizontal price fixing.65 The court stated, “there is ‘a plain 
distinction between the lawful right to publish prices . . . on the one hand, 
and an agreement among competitors limiting action with respect to the 
published prices, on the other.’”66 The court held that “Maryland’s 
horizontal price fixing was a per se violation of the Sherman Act.”67 The 
court specifically rejected Maryland’s argument that the restraints concerned 
vertical-resale price maintenance, which are no longer per se illegal under 
Leegin.68 “In fact, Leegin, far from undermining our conclusion that 
horizontal price fixing is per se illegal under the Sherman Act, actually 
reiterates that rule.”69 The Court in Leegin stated, “per se unlawfulness 
applies to horizontal market division and horizontal price fixing because 
both have similar economic effect.”70 Essentially, the Fourth Circuit upheld 
its previous decision that the regulatory scheme “mandated activity that was 
‘essentially a form of horizontal price fixing’”71 and “a per se violation of 
the Sherman Act.”72
III. THE LIQUOR ACT
The Twenty-First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
recognizes states’ power to regulate alcohol within their borders.73 Most 
states, including Connecticut, follow a three-tier distribution system 
preventing consumers from purchasing alcohol directly from a producer.74
Instead, the producer makes the alcohol, sells to a retailer (often utilizing a 
                                                                                                                         
62 Id. at 900.  
63 Id. at 900–01.
64 TFWS, Inc. v. Franchot, 572 F.3d 186, 188 (4th Cir. 2009). 
65 Id. at 192. 
66 Id. (quoting Catalano v. United States, 446 U.S. 643, 649–50 (1980)). 
67 Id.
68 See id. (noting the distinction that Leegin held vertical resale price maintenance subject to the 
rule of reason, whereas Maryland’s liquor laws were horizontal restraints and per se illegal).  
69 Id.
70 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 904 (2007). 
71 TFWS, Inc., 572 F.3d at 190.
72 Id. at 192; TFWS, Inc. v. Shaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 209 (4th Cir. 2001).
73 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
74 STATE OF CONN., COMPETITIVE ALCOHOLIC LIQUOR PRICING TASK FORCE 2012-R-0502 7
(2012), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/rpt/pdf/2012-R-0502.pdf [https://perma.cc/5N24-P994].
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wholesale distributor, but not always), and finally, the consumer purchases 
from the retailer.75
A. The Post-and-Hold Requirement
The Liquor Act establishes the state’s regulatory structure for alcohol 
sales within the state.76 Under the Liquor Act, wine and spirits manufacturers 
and wholesalers must post their prices on a monthly basis with the 
Department of Consumer Protection (“DCP”), which distributes posted 
prices to the manufacturers and wholesalers, and maintains the set price for 
the following month.77 A limited window (four days from posting) exists for 
manufacturers to amend their price even after posting.78 Prices may be 
lowered to match a competitor, but not raised.79
Total Wine argues that the post-and-hold requirement eliminates 
“almost any incentive for wholesalers to compete on price.”80 If a wholesaler 
decides to lower its price, the price is posted and holds for the following 
month.81 Competitors are immediately aware of the price reduction and can 
match prices.82 “The post-and-hold regime thus provides a perfect veil to 
enshroud an active horizontal agreement among wholesalers to fix prices.”83
Connecticut responds that post-and-hold requirements “effectuate[] a
legitimate state interest in protecting small retailers from price 
discrimination by wholesalers,”84 are not per se unlawful, and argues the 
                                                                                                                         
75 Id.
76 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 30–63 (2017).
77 Id. at § 30–63(c).
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Plaintiff’s Consolidated Opposition to Defendants’ and Intervenors’ Motions to Dismiss at 10, 
Connecticut Fine Wine & Spirits v. Harris, 255 F. Supp. 3d 355 (D. Conn. 2017) (No. 3:16-cv-1434) 
[hereinafter Plaintiff’s Consolidated Opposition Brief].      
81 Id.  
82 Id.
83 Id. at 11.  
84 State Defendants’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 6, Connecticut Fine 
Wine & Spirits v. Harris, 255 F. Supp. 3d 355 (D. Conn. 2017) (No. 3:16-cv-1434).
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Ninth Circuit incorrectly struck down Washington’s post-and-hold law.85
Connecticut and the intervenors rely on the Battipaglia decision upholding 
New York’s post-and-hold laws and argue that the Supreme Court’s decision
in 324 Liquor Corp. did not overrule Battipaglia.86 The intervenors argue 
the Fourth and Ninth Circuit “cases were incorrectly decided and thus have 
no persuasive value” regarding the Connecticut post-and-hold regulation.87
B. The Minimum-Pricing Standard
The minimum-pricing standard prohibits retailers from selling alcohol 
below “cost.”88 “Cost” for alcohol is defined as the posted bottle price from 
the wholesaler plus shipping or delivery charges to the retailer’s business.89
Wholesalers also operate what are termed “off-post” months during 
which the case price is lowered but the bottle price remains high.90
According to Total Wine, “[w]holesalers know that retailers buy almost 
exclusively by the case and that they will buy larger quantities during ‘off-
post’ months.”91 However, because of the minimum-pricing standard, 
retailers are still required to sell the product at a high price because cost is 
calculated based on the artificially high bottle price.92 Total Wine argues that 
since retailers have no ability to sell below cost, essentially, wholesalers are 
setting the prices that consumers pay, making the restraint both vertical and 
horizontal.93 “These provisions authorize horizontal price fixing among 
inefficient retailers . . . to conceal a horizontal agreement not to sell below a 
‘floor’ price—and thereby inflate retail prices—in order to preserve 
artificially high profit margins. Such horizontal agreements to set minimum
prices constitute quintessential illegal price fixing.”94
Connecticut responds that the minimum-pricing standard “effectuates a 
legitimate state interest in precluding ‘artificial inducements to purchase 
liquor [that] will result in increased consumption.’”95 Connecticut and the 
intervenors argue that the regulations should not be considered as a bundle, 
but evaluated independently of each other as in the Costco case.96 They 
further argue that the minimum-pricing standard, evaluated on its own apart 
                                                                                                                         
85 Id. at 4, 6.
86 Id. at 4; Intervenors’ Brief, supra note 9, at 10.
87 Intervenors’ Brief, supra note 9, at 10.
88 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 30-68m(b) (2016).
89 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 30-68m(a)(1) (2016).
90 Connecticut Fine Wine & Spirits v. Harris, 255 F. Supp. 3d 355, 362 (D. Conn. 2017).   
91 Complaint, supra note 1, at 5.   
92 Id. 
93 Plaintiff’s Consolidated Opposition Brief, supra note 80, at 10.   
94 Id. at 12.  
95 State Defendants’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 6, Connecticut Fine 
Wine & Spirits v. Harris, 255 F. Supp. 3d 355 (D. Conn. 2017) (No. 3:16-cv-1434) (alteration in original) 
(citations omitted) [hereinafter State’s Reply Brief].     
96 Id. at 4; Intervenors’ Brief, supra note 9, at 12.
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from the post-and-hold regulation, is a vertical restraint and, under Leegin,
does not violate antitrust law.97
C. The Volume-Discount Prohibition
The volume-discount prohibition bans price reductions, which 
otherwise could be used to incentivize retailers to purchase larger quantities 
of merchandise.98 Wholesalers must sell every bottle and case of alcohol to 
every retailer at the same price, regardless of the amount the retailer 
charges.99 Total Wine argues that the volume-discount prohibition 
“authorizes both horizontal and vertical price fixing” by “reinforcing the 
mandatory price-posting laws.”100 The intervenors again respond that the 
restraint should be evaluated individually, is a vertical restraint, and 
therefore, is not preempted by the antitrust law.101 Connecticut further states 
that the regulations simply permit wholesalers to “price match pursuant to a 
precisely delineated and closely monitored process.”102 To the contrary, they 
“do not mandate or authorize wholesalers or retailers to contract, combine, 
or conspire in restraint of trade, nor do they place irresistible pressure on any 
private party to violate the antitrust laws in order to comply with the 
state.”103
D. Application to Connecticut’s Liquor Laws
Following Leegin, the critical question is whether a particular statute is 
a horizontal or vertical restraint. Connecticut and the intervenors argue that 
the Liquor Act regulations are vertical restraints, and therefore are not per 
se illegal, and are not preempted by the antitrust law. Conversely, Total 
Wine argues that the Liquor Act regulations result in horizontal, as well as 
vertical, price fixing and that the vertical price fixing is inextricably tied to 
the horizontal price fixing, creating “irresistible pressure on retailers to 
collude ‘vertically’ with wholesalers.”104
The Liquor Act, in a purely directional sense, has elements that are 
vertical in nature. The minimum-price standard is set by the wholesaler, paid 
by the retailer, and then paid by the consumer.105 The volume-discount 
prohibition prevents retailers from buying vertically from the wholesaler at 
                                                                                                                         
97 Intervenors’ Brief, supra note 9, at 13–14.
98 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 30-68k (2017). 
99 Id.
100 Plaintiff’s Consolidated Opposition Brief, supra note 80, at 14.
101 Intervenors’ Brief, supra note 9, at 9–10. 
102 State’s Reply Brief, supra note 95, at 6.
103 Id. 
104 Plaintiff’s Consolidated Opposition Brief, supra note 80, at 42.
105 See supra Part III.B.
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a discounted rate.106 However, what distinguishes the Liquor Act from a 
simple directional question of vertical versus horizontal is the post-and-hold 
provision that lurks in the background.107
Under the post-and-hold regulation, the fixed price that is horizontally 
shared and set by wholesalers carries downstream all the way to the 
consumer.108 Whatever price wholesalers arrive at for a particular product 
for the month is not only the price to retailers, but also the minimum price 
to consumers.109 Resale price posting is not simply allowed; it is mandated
by the regulation.110 Furthermore, resale price is not fixed by a single 
supplier, but by all suppliers once pricing information among suppliers is 
shared and matched.111 The Supreme Court in 324 Liquor Corp. stated that 
“[m]andatory industrywide resale price fixing is virtually certain to reduce 
interbrand competition as well as intrabrand competition, because it prevents 
manufacturers and wholesalers from allowing or requiring retail price 
competition.”112 Leegin still controls when there is one supplier, saying that 
vertical price fixing should be judged under the rule of reason. This, 
however, is a very different case, where the entire state alcoholic-beverage 
market is controlled by vertical price fixing. 
IV. STATE-ACTION IMMUNITY
Once a regulation is deemed an antitrust violation, the court must then 
determine whether the regulations are immune to antitrust laws under the 
state-action immunity doctrine. Parker v. Brown established state-action 
immunity when it held that the Sherman Act was not “intended to restrain 
state action or official action directed by a state.”113 “[W]here the state, 
acting as a sovereign, imposes restraints on competition, the state is immune 
from antitrust liability . . . .”114 In order to determine whether a regulatory 
scheme is immune, the court must first determine whether the regulation is 
unilateral or hybrid.115 A unilateral restraint is when a state imposes, and 
private actors abide by, a regulation.116 A hybrid restraint, on the other hand, 
grants private actors the ability to control market forces through a 
                                                                                                                         
106 See supra Part III.C.
107 See supra Part III.A.
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110 See supra Part III.A.
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112 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 341–42 (1987).  
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regulation.117 In the hybrid scenario, the private actors have the ability to 
manipulate the market and represent their own interests, rather than simply 
following a directive from the state.118 A unilateral restraint is immune from 
antitrust law.119 A hybrid restraint, however, is not immune, and must be 
further evaluated to determine whether the restraint is clearly articulated and 
actively supervised by the state.120
Total Wine claims that the restrictions are hybrid in nature, enabling 
private actors to manipulate the market, unsupervised, and set their own 
prices.121 The Fourth Circuit in TFWS said “the post-and-hold system is a 
classic hybrid restraint: the State requires wholesalers to set prices and stick 
to them, but it does not review those privately set prices for 
reasonableness . . . .”122 Ultimately, wholesalers are granted private 
regulatory power.123 The Ninth Circuit also found Washington’s post-and-
hold laws to be hybrid, rather than unilateral restraints.124
In its motion to dismiss, Connecticut argues that the Liquor Act 
restrictions are unilateral and therefore immune.125 Connecticut argues that 
the 1984 Second Circuit decision in Battipaglia v. New York State Liquor 
Authority controls.126 At issue in Battipaglia were the New York post-and-
hold laws.127 In Judge Friendly’s analysis, the New York regulations 
warranted a rule of reason analysis, rather than per se condemnation, 
requiring certain “plus” factors where the collusion among competitors 
could be explained by parties acting in parallel without some sort of explicit 
agreement.128 Judge Friendly questioned whether post-and-hold laws 
constituted an actual agreement and ruled conservatively that a more 
thorough analysis was required rather than per se condemnation.129 This 
rationale has not been persuasive elsewhere. The Ninth Circuit in Costco
considered the Battipaglia decision, but declined to follow it.130 The Costco 
court instead relied on the conclusion that the Supreme Court came to in 324 
Liquor Corp. where it “made it clear that an actual ‘contract, combination, 
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or conspiracy’ need not be shown for a state statute to be preempted by the 
Sherman Act.”131
In TFWS, the Fourth Circuit addressed the concern that the hybrid nature 
of post-and-hold regulations would “allow private business to set prices,
mandate price-filing and price-holding, and allow industry players to 
facilitate detection of would-be price cutters.”132 By granting private actors 
“the tools to engage in coordinated pricing,” the regulations are the 
definition of hybrid, rather than unilateral restraints.133
If a regulation is determined to be a hybrid, the state must meet two 
criteria to qualify for state-action immunity: (1) the state must clearly 
articulate and affirmatively express state policy, and (2) the state must 
actively supervise the regulation.134 Total Wine claims that the regulations 
do not meet the active supervision element.135 The complaint states that 
“[n]o agency or instrumentality of the state of Connecticut actively 
supervises the posting, matching, and coordination of bottle and case prices 
among manufacturers and wholesalers of alcoholic beverages.”136
Connecticut argues in response that the regulations enable the state to 
enforce their stated goal of preventing price discrimination among retailers 
and detecting violations.137 By forcing wholesalers to publicly post their 
prices, the state can monitor and ensure that large and small retailers receive 
the same pricing and that the DCP is able to detect violations.138
Although the Liquor Act procedurally allows the state to ensure that 
industry participants set and maintain prices, the prices themselves are 
determined by industry participants, not the state. The state is not ensuring 
that the prices are competitive or that there is competition among 
participants. The intervenors argue that out-of-circuit decisions are not 
controlling and should not be followed.139 This would dismiss the decisions
in Costco and TFWS, which held post-and-hold statutes to be hybrid 
restraints.140 They argue that the proper precedent to follow is Battipaglia.141
Battipaglia was decided almost thirty years ago and stands as a lone island 
in the face of the contrary circuit court cases, as well as 324 Liquor Corp.
In granting the motion to dismiss, Judge Janet C. Hall determined that 
the three regulations at issue should be severed and analyzed individually, 
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rather than as a whole regulatory scheme.142 In support of this decision, 
Judge Hall looked to federalist principles.143 She stated that by separating 
the provisions, the court would “give ‘due regard’ for the policy judgment 
of the people of the state of Connecticut,” and strike down no more than is 
required. 144 Additionally, Judge Hall cited Sections one through three of the 
Connecticut General Statutes, which states: “If any provision of any 
act . . . is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or
applications of such act.”145 “[T]he invalidity of certain portions of state 
statutes should, as a general matter, not infect other portions of that 
statute.”146 Based on these two supporting arguments, Judge Hall proceeded 
to evaluate each regulation separately.147
The Ninth Circuit addressed the severability issue in Costco when it 
faced the same question regarding nine challenged provisions to 
Washington’s regulatory scheme.148 The Ninth Circuit also severed the  
regulations.149 Total Wine’s case is arguably distinct in that there are only 
three regulations, and the three work together to achieve the state’s purposes. 
In analyzing severability, Judge Hall stated that “there can be little doubt 
that the three challenged sets of provisions function, at least to some extent, 
together to effectuate the legislature’s policy goals.”150 The harm to 
competition comes from the wholesalers using the three regulations together 
in order to set a floor price below which no alcohol can be sold, and then 
holding that price to prevent any competition between wholesalers and 
retailers. 
The second determination that Judge Hall made was to follow the 1984 
holding in Battipaglia.151 According to Judge Hall, Battipaglia stands for the 
proposition that post-and-hold provisions are horizontal restraints subject to 
rule of reason analysis rather than per se condemnation, stating “[w]hether 
or not this court would reach a different conclusion if it were writing on a 
blank slate is immaterial: Battipaglia constitutes binding precedent.” 152 The 
courts in 324 Liquor Corp., Costco, and TFWS reached different 
conclusions. In all three of these cases, which are more recent than 
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Battipaglia, post-and-hold provisions were deemed horizontal restraints in 
violation of the Sherman Act and not immune under state action 
immunity.153 Judge Hall, finding the post-and-hold restraint to be hybrid, 
stated that “[t]he post and hold provisions at issue here are remarkably 
similar to the statutes that the Supreme Court concluded constituted a hybrid 
restraint in 324 Liquor.”154 However, when evaluating whether the post-and-
hold provisions are per se violations, Judge Hall stated that “Connecticut’s 
post-and-hold provisions are in all material respects identical to those upheld 
by the Second Circuit in Battipaglia. They are therefore not preempted by 
the Sherman Act.”155
V. STATE-INTEREST JUSTIFICATION
The final step in evaluating a state’s alcoholic-beverage-regulatory
scheme is determining whether the state’s justification for the regulations 
supersedes the antitrust interest.156 This step is a balancing test that weighs 
the federal interest in competitive markets against a state’s interest in 
regulating the sale and distribution of alcohol within its borders.157 It is a 
“pragmatic effort to harmonize state and federal powers.”158 The state 
interest must be closely related to the powers recognized by the Twenty-
First Amendment, and the challenged liquor regulations must directly serve 
the specific state interest under the Amendment.159
In 324 Liquor Corp., the Court concluded that New York’s interests 
were insufficient to provide immunity from the Sherman Act.160 New York 
argued that the restrictions protected small liquor retailers.161 When New 
York made this argument, the record showed that the number of retail liquor 
shops in New York had declined.162 The Court also looked to the holding in 
Midcal, which stated that “the State’s unsubstantiated interest in protecting 
small retailers ‘simply [is] not of the same stature as the goals of the Sherman 
Act.’”163 New York argued that the regulations promoted the state interest 
of temperance.164 The irony of a state interest in more small retail shops in 
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order to promote temperance did not slip by the Court.165 Although the Court 
left the determination of consumption to the power of the state, it ultimately 
concluded that the Twenty-First Amendment did not shield the state’s 
regulations from an antitrust violation.166
In Costco, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s finding that 
the state’s interest in temperance “[did] not outweigh the federal interest in 
promoting competition under the Sherman Act.”167 The court concluded that 
the Twenty-First Amendment did not shield Washington from antitrust 
laws.168 The Fourth Circuit in TFWS similarly held that the antitrust interest 
outweighed the state interest in temperance.169 In the Total Wine case, 
“neither the defendants nor the intervenors have suggested at this time that 
any of the challenged provisions might be saved by the Twenty-[F]irst 
Amendment.”170
CONCLUSION
The initial question that this Note sought to answer was: which interest 
wins when a state’s alcoholic beverage regulatory scheme conflicts with 
antitrust laws—state interests or antitrust-law interests? The answer is, of 
course: it depends. The Sherman Act is broad and grants significant power 
to the federal government to defend antitrust principles and promote 
competition. So long as the competition as a whole is not harmed, businesses
are free to set their own prices, innovate, and develop efficiencies as they 
see fit. With those same principles in mind, states have the authority to make 
laws and regulations as they deem appropriate. What a state cannot do is set 
up a regulatory scheme where private businesses act under the guise of the 
state and manipulate the market for their own private interests without any 
state supervision. 
The Liquor Act accomplishes the latter effect. The post-and-hold law 
mandates the sharing of pricing which enables wholesalers to price compare 
and match their competitors’ prices. Wholesalers can essentially eliminate 
any need whatsoever to compete on price. The post-and-hold law then 
requires wholesalers to maintain prices for an entire month. While vertical 
minimum resale price maintenance has come to be seen as having both pro-
and anticompetitive effects, and is no longer considered a per se violation, 
there is something clearly anticompetitive about the post-and-hold 
regulatory scheme that has attracted much scrutiny and condemnation in the 
courts. Post-and-hold sets up a framework for collusion leading to market 
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conditions which antitrust law seeks to condemn: higher prices and reduced 
incentive for competition, efficiencies, and innovation. It is virtually 
impossible to imagine a scenario where wholesalers would not take 
advantage of this framework in which collusion is not only legal—it is 
required. This price sharing and matching, if done outside of the Liquor Act 
framework, would constitute the most basic antitrust law violation of 
coordination and combination. Instead, Connecticut mandates collusion 
under the Liquor Act and claims that these laws stabilize the alcohol industry 
and protect small merchants. That may be true, but it is at the cost of 
competition. It is time for Connecticut to stop shielding the alcoholic-
beverage industry from the antitrust principles that the federal government,
the state of Connecticut, and consumers value: innovation, efficiency, and 
price competition.
